The United States has a firm commitment to the international order, whether the average American likes it or not, and if the country disappeared tomorrow, there would only be chaos. Most of this relies on America’s behavior from the past eight to twelve decades in the international system. With its prequel in the Crimea dilemma, there is a full-blown war in Ukraine, and Europe must come to terms with something it knows better than any other continent. Americans and Europeans alike kowtowing to Russia doesn’t make them better people, and Russian apologists are fundamentally problematic. As a result, there are some basic pointers that must be put to rest.
First and foremost, the United States did not start or cause the war in Ukraine. The United States does not have a military presence in either Russia or Ukraine in the present and certainly did not over a year ago. Even if so, not nearly enough to manufacture a war. Crimea also does not constitute probable cause on Russia’s part to start the event they started anyway. Russia’s military excursions trace back to the turn of the century, presenting more aggressive goals each time.
Second, like the first point, NATO did not start or cause the war in Ukraine. While the easternmost part of the organization is the farthest from the Atlantic Ocean it’s ever been, just wait until you hear that at one point in time, the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s renowned predecessor, once wanted to join the alliance. The Warsaw Pact, the original counterpart to NATO, dissolved over three decades ago, and a majority of its former members became disillusioned with communism to the point where a Russian alliance had no substance in the future. In fact, there are still enough states that fall well under Russia’s influence that were once a part of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Belarus was the most obvious, while also the most likely to join the war. Then comes the Asian states, with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, comes the more abstract areas such as Kaliningrad, the isolated area near the borders of central Europe to the Transnistria region of western Moldova. Notably comes along Russian-occupied territories in Georgia from the 2008 war that was essentially a fire drill for Ukraine. NATO never started the war, but rather witnessed Russia exercise what it can do to neighboring countries ever since the formation of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Russia still holds influence in the Balkans, most notably through Serbia, while characters like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán illustrate the delicacy of Russian relations.
This is not to say that NATO has not expanded significantly during the collapse of the Soviet Union. It certainly has, snatching up some of the former western republics, but NATO’s expansion is a reaction to broken Russian promises. Near the end of the prior century, Russia was meant to remove troops from Moldova and Georgia, but never did, and it remains the case today. Since the Crimea crisis, Montenegro and North Macedonia have joined NATO—two states notably near Serbia. Further back in time, near when Putin was about to exit office for the first time, 2009 brought in Albania and Croatia, which illustrated a pathway for the future of the Balkans after a turbulent 90s. Such countries then have the benefit of the American nuclear umbrella, while, more importantly, they improved internally as sovereign nations. If anything, such countries that joined NATO should be applauded, rather than guilt-tripped for present day affairs and an inflection of responsibility that can’t be justified. Now, fluently functioning nations like Finland and Sweden seek to become a part of NATO, as Russia still struggles to take a hint. One thing remains clear, NATO would have no need to expand if Russia could be trusted in full transparency within the European community.
Third, it is not the responsibility of the United States to initiate peace talks with the Russian Federation. At the end of the day, the war in Ukraine ultimately remains a European conflict and the parties directly involved, Russia and Ukraine, must sort it out with one another. The major point of contention, as all know by now, is that Crimea is on its way to be possessed by Russia for a whole decade. Every passing day makes Crimea more Russian than it is Ukrainian, and the elimination of the Ukrainian state as a whole is not an option. The United States should certainly endorse a peace process that makes sense while questioning the motives of newer actors, such as China. Like T’Pau once suggested, China’s entry would be as delicate as “China in your hand.” Part of the reasoning for internal negotiations actually hints back at something Putin mentioned himself after the war in Georgia, when he argued that the state should not seek “solutions outside” and should “conduct a dialogue without citing third parties.” The fundamentals for dialogue between Ukraine and Russia must be held amongst themselves to exclusively promote their own interests.
Fourth, any Russian theories about land ownership mean that most countries in the world would no longer exist. The one thing that no one tells you about the Kievan Rus is that their predecessors were…Vikings—the people of the Nordics and the same style of explorers that once flirted with the Western Hemisphere. If Putin’s logic dares to tread that far in history, we might as well go back to the age of the Roman Empire at its peak. The only question is how Russia’s politics will fare once Putin is through. Crimea belongs to Ukraine in the 21st century and so does Donbas and the rest of the east. People should not be treated like Richard Gere at the 1993 Academy Awards when he discussed Tibet for thinking otherwise.
One thing remains clear throughout history though: an autocrat will always find a way to ruin something. This time, it’s once again international order as we know it, which we can stop.